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Abstract
The Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit was a major exercise in deliberative public engagement 
conducted in autumn 2017. It brought together fifty randomly selected members of the public 
for two carefully structured weekends of listening, learning, reflecting and discussing. 
Assembly Members considered what post-Brexit arrangements the UK should pursue, 
focusing on trade and migration. On trade, most Members wanted the UK to pursue a 
bespoke arrangement with the EU and rejected the option of leaving the EU with no deal. On 
migration, most wanted the UK to maintain free movement of labour while using already 
available policy levers to reduce immigration numbers. These findings provide unique insight 
into informed public opinion on vital, pressing policy questions. The Assembly also illustrates 
the valuable role that such deliberative exercises could play in UK democracy. We suggest 
they could be particular helpful for unlocking progress on issues, such as the future of social 
care, that are often felt to be ‘too difficult’ to handle.
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Introduction
What kind of Brexit do the public think the UK should pursue? The Brexit vote told us that a 
majority of voters wanted to leave the EU, but it said little about their preferences for the 
form that Brexit should take. Public opinion surveys offer some insights, but often encourage 
respondents to provide simple answers to complex questions; they shed little light on public 
attitudes relating to necessary trade-offs, and do not give respondents a chance to absorb or 
discuss key information on the issue in question. 
A major exercise in deliberative public engagement conducted in autumn 2017 – the 
Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit – offers much deeper evidence. It provides unique insights into 
what kind of Brexit voters want once they have had a chance to learn about the options and 
arguments, think them through carefully, and discuss them with a wide range of their peers. 
This article sets out the Assembly’s findings and the lessons that can be drawn from them. 
First, we outline what the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit was: a body of fifty people reflecting 
the diversity of the UK electorate, who gathered over two carefully structured weekends to 
reach conclusions on what post-Brexit arrangements the UK should pursue. Second, we set 
out the Assembly’s conclusions. The Assembly focused on two major policy areas: trade and 
migration. Most Members wanted the UK to pursue a bespoke trading arrangement with the 
EU. They strongly rejected the option of leaving the EU with no trade deal. On migration, 
most wanted the UK to maintain free movement of labour while using already available 
policy levers to reduce immigration numbers. 
The third section assesses what weight we should place on these findings by examining the 
degree to which the Assembly can reasonably be said to provide insights into informed, 
considered public opinion. We suggest that it scores very highly. Finally, we consider the 
broader lessons that the Assembly provides for the part that deliberative exercises such as 
this might play in UK democracy in the future. We argue that such bodies could have a major 
role in strengthening democratic policy-making.
The Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit
The Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit brought together a cross-section of the UK electorate to 
deliberate on key Brexit choices and deliver recommendations. It was modelled on previous 
citizens’ assemblies in Canada, the Netherlands, and Ireland, which led to referendums on 
electoral reform in two Canadian provinces and on same-sex marriage and abortion in 
Ireland.1 Citizens’ assemblies seek to embody a deliberative conception of democracy, 
according to which decision-making follows an inclusive process of discussion where all 
perspectives are heard and considered carefully in light of evidence.
The Assembly was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and organised by 
a team led from the Constitution Unit at University College London and comprising the 
authors of this article.2
The fifty members of the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit were chosen through random 
selection to reflect the diversity of the UK electorate. A UK-wide survey with 5,000 
respondents was conducted by ICM in July 2017, including questions on whether 
respondents would be interested in participating in the Assembly. Those who answered 
positively were stratified according to six criteria: age, gender, ethnicity, social class, place of 
residence, and how they voted in the 2016 EU referendum. They were then selected 
randomly within these groups and contacted individually until the required number and 
balance of people had been recruited. Table 1 shows that the Assembly membership closely 
resembled the wider population on all criteria but one: non-voters in the referendum were 
under-represented. Crucially, the Assembly reflected the referendum outcome in that slightly 
more Members voted Leave than Remain.
Table 1. Composition of the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit




35–54 38 34Age (years)
55+ 34 37
Female 48 51Gender Male 52 49
White 86 86Ethnicity Non-white 14 14
North 22 23
Midlands 14 16






Northern Ireland 6 3
ABC1 50 55Social class C2DE 50 45
Voted to remain 44 35
Voted to leave 50 37Referendum vote 2016
Did not vote 6 28
Source: Alan Renwick, Sarah Allan, Will Jennings, Rebecca McKee, Meg Russell, and Graham Smith, A 
Considered Public Voice on Brexit: The Report of the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit. London: Constitution Unit, 
2017, p. 27. Available at http://citizensassembly.co.uk/brexit/about/.
The overarching question considered by the Assembly was: What kind of Brexit should the 
UK seek? Within this, it focused on two key policy areas: trade and migration. The Assembly 
thus did not reopen the question asked in the 2016 referendum: the intention was to feed 
into current government policy-making. Nor did it examine all aspects of Brexit: a narrow 
focus was essential to allow considered discussion within the time available.
The Assembly met over two weekends in Manchester. These weekends were designed with 
five core principles in mind: maximising the inclusiveness of the discussions for all Members; 
promoting understanding of the issues at stake; ensuring balance among competing 
perspectives on the kind of Brexit the UK should seek; promoting effective deliberation 
among Assembly Members; and allowing Members space to engage in personal reflection. 
In pursuit of these principles, plans for the weekends were developed in close collaboration 
with Involve, a charity specialising in deliberative public engagement. The first weekend was 
the ‘learning’ phase, during which Members reflected on their own ideas, listened to other 
Members, and engaged closely with leading experts on trade, migration, and the EU. These 
experts reflected a range of perspectives. They were selected in consultation with a diverse 
Advisory Board, who comprised both supporters and opponents of Brexit, as well as neutral 
experts experienced in presenting balanced information. The Advisory Board also provided 
detailed guidance during the development of a series of briefing papers, which Members 
could read between the weekends.3
The second weekend was largely devoted to the ‘discussion and decision’ phase. This was 
an opportunity for Members to deliberate in depth among themselves before deciding their 
own views. They also reflected on their thinking and were reminded of the options available 
and what the experts had said about them. They then voted on these options by secret 
ballot.
Throughout the two weekends, the discussions were guided by experienced facilitators led 
by Involve. This was essential to ensure that conversations remained on track and to enable 
all Members to participate fully according to the core deliberative principles. Two lead 
facilitators guided the Assembly from the front. Most of the discussions took place in small 
groups of seven or eight Members, each with its own table facilitator. Members also 
developed ‘conversation guidelines’ for the Assembly at the start of the first weekend, 
including the principles that all should listen, be respectful, and be open to changing their 
minds.
The Assembly’s recommendations
Assembly Members began by considering what they most wanted to be able to value about 
the country in which they live. The ideas they developed did not have to relate specifically to 
Brexit: this was simply an opportunity for people to start thinking about what mattered to 
them. Initial table discussions produced a list of options, which Members then voted on. 
Each Member had four votes. The options receiving most votes are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. What do you want to be able to value about the country in which you live?
Value Votes 
received
Quality of public services
Effective democracy












Members then built on this initial discussion to develop policy guidelines in relation to both 
trade and migration. As is apparent from Table 3, Members’ ambitions for trade policy were 
wide-ranging and included some items – notably the desire to avoid a hard border with 
Ireland – that at the time had received little public attention. On migration, meanwhile, 
Members were clearly concerned that policy-makers should not focus just on the rules about 
who can or cannot stay in the UK. They also wanted the government to attend to domestic 
policies that might affect migration patterns – such as training for UK nationals – and to 
outcomes that are affected by migration – such as the quality of public services.
Table 3. Guidelines for trade and migration policy
UK trade policy should… UK migration policy should…
Minimise harm to the economy
Protect the NHS and public services
Maintain living standards
Take account of impacts on all parts of the 
UK
Protect workers’ rights
Avoid a hard border with Ireland
Invest in training for UK nationals
Keep better data on migrants
Enable us to sustain public services
Benefit our economy
Be responsive to regional need
Include better planning of public services
Having developed these policy guidelines, Members then considered and voted on concrete 
options for post-Brexit trade and migration policy. We split trade policy into two areas: trade 
with the EU; and trade with countries beyond the EU. That meant there were three policy 
areas in total. 
Before each vote, Members heard an introductory presentation that outlined the options 
available, recapping key themes from the first weekend’s expert presentations and the 
briefing papers. They then debated the options and their preferences in small groups (with 
scope to ask questions to experts in the room if they wanted). Finally, they voted by secret 
ballot, ranking the options in order of preference.
At present, trade with the EU is governed primarily by the UK’s membership of the Single 
Market. The Assembly considered four possible approaches for the future:
• Option A: Stay in the Single Market, at least as it relates to goods and services.
• Option B: Leave the Single Market, and seek a comprehensive trade deal that would 
maintain zero tariffs and minimise non-tariff barriers through harmonisation or mutual 
recognition.
• Option C: Leave the Single Market and seek a limited trade deal that would maintain 
zero tariffs but not address non-tariff barriers.
• Option D: Do no trade deal with the EU.
As Figure 1 shows, Members’ first preferences spread widely across the first three options; 
few chose the fourth, ‘no deal’ option. The plurality option was a limited trade deal (option C); 
but most Members (twenty-eight out of fifty) preferred some kind of closer relationship with 
the EU (option A or B).
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Figure 2 takes account not just of first preferences, but also of Members’ second, third and 
fourth preferences. It assigns three points to a first preference, two to a second preference, 
one to a third preference, and none to a fourth preference. Using this approach, the option of 
a comprehensive trade deal came marginally ahead, as it received many second 
preferences. This option also comes first if the preferences are counted using the Alternative 
Vote method.4
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We asked Assembly Members to rank the options primarily because it may be that the UK 
cannot get everything it wants. While the UK government is seeking a comprehensive trade 
deal that gives the easiest possible access for UK goods and services to the Single Market, 
the remaining EU countries have warned they will not allow the UK to ‘cherry-pick’. The 
voting also allows us to see Assembly Members’ preferences if a bespoke deal turns out to 
be unavailable. 
Figure 3 shows Members’ first preferences if a comprehensive trade deal cannot be 
negotiated. In this scenario, most Members preferred the UK to do a limited trade deal rather 
than take either the off-the-peg option of continuing Single Market membership (should the 
EU allow it) or the option of no deal. Figure 4 then shows preferences if no bespoke trade 
deal at all can be done. If the choice comes down to one between Single Market 
membership and no deal, most Members preferred the UK to stay in the Single Market.
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Note: To calculate these figures, we eliminated option B from the count and redistributed the votes it had 
received according to second preferences. We thus count as if option B had not been on the ballot paper.
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Note: To calculate these figures, we eliminated options B and C from the count and redistributed the votes they 
had received according to second and, where necessary, third preferences.
How the UK trades with countries outside the EU is currently structured mainly by its 
membership of the EU Customs Union. That membership means that EU tariffs are imposed 
on imports from outside the EU into the UK. The UK cannot negotiate its own trade deals 
with countries outside the EU, but it participates in deals done by the EU. It also means there 
are no customs checks on the border between the UK and other EU countries.
The Assembly considered three options for governing post-Brexit trade with countries 
outside the EU:
• Option A: Stay in the Customs Union, so that the UK applies EU external tariffs 
and joins (but does not, as a result of Brexit, take part in negotiating) EU trade 
deals.
• Option B: Do a bespoke customs deal with the EU allowing the UK to conduct its 
own international trade policy while maintaining a frictionless UK/EU border.
• Option C: Do no customs deal, so that the UK can conduct its own trade policy, 
but physical customs controls on the UK/EU border are needed.
As shown in Figure 5, Members, by a substantial majority, saw a bespoke deal as the best 
option. 
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Whether a bespoke deal of this kind is feasible, however, remains in doubt. Should it prove 
impossible, a large majority of Assembly Members, as Figure 6 shows, said that the UK 
should stay in the Customs Union rather than leave the EU with no customs deal. They thus 
prioritised maintaining a frictionless UK/EU border over freeing the UK to conduct its own 
international trade policy.
Figure 6. Trade beyond the EU: if a bespoke customs deal is unavailable
37
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Note: In order to calculate these figures, we eliminated option B from the count and redistributed the votes it had 
received according to second preferences.
The Assembly’s decisive rejection of the ‘no deal’ options for trade with both EU and non-EU 
countries is striking. It is not a comment on whether keeping these options on the table is a 
good negotiating strategy: that is not what the Assembly considered. But it does raise doubts 
about the credibility of this strategy: if, in late 2018 or 2019, public opinion is similarly hostile 
to leaving the EU with no deal, it will be hard for any government to push such a Brexit 
through.
Moving from trade to migration, migration between the UK and the EU is currently governed 
by the EU principle of free movement, which applies to people in employment or self-
employment, as well as to students and anyone who can sustain themselves financially. The 
Assembly considered five options for post-Brexit policy:
• Option A: Maintain free movement of labour and continue to operate it as today.
• Option B: Maintain free movement of labour, but make full use of available 
controls to prevent abuse of the system.
• Option C: End free movement and reduce immigration overall, but continue giving 
EU citizens favourable access compared with people from outside the EU.
• Option D: Remove any preference for EU over non-EU citizens, while maintaining 
current immigration levels.
• Option E: Remove any preference for EU over non-EU citizens, and reduce 
immigration overall.
These options vary on two dimensions: the degree of preference given to EU over non-EU 
immigration; and the overall level of immigration into the UK. These two dimensions do not 
always coincide. Some people who want to end free movement between the UK and the EU 
do not want to cut immigration: rather, they want the UK to ‘fish in a global pool of talent’. 
Equally, not everyone who wants to maintain favourable access for EU nationals to the UK 
wants also to maintain current levels of immigration: they may prefer EU over non-EU 
immigration for economic or cultural reasons.
It is worth noting that we presented more options at this stage of the Assembly’s 
proceedings than we had originally envisaged. We added option B after the Assembly’s first 
weekend to reflect feedback from Members, who had been interested to learn from the 
expert speakers that Single Market rules do not confer an unconditional right on all EU 
citizens to reside in the UK, but that the UK makes little attempt to remove those who do not 
have a right to remain. 
As Figure 7 shows, an absolute majority (but a bare absolute majority) of Assembly 
Members preferred option B over all alternatives. This was despite the fact that we 
presented evidence indicating that the impact of exercising the available controls on total 
immigrant numbers would be small: likely in the low thousands. Strikingly, only seven 
Members chose option E as their first preference, which we clearly presented as the option 
that would reduce total immigration most. Retrospective analysis of the responses to the 
survey through which Assembly Members were recruited in summer 2017 indicates that 
there was a slight skew in the Assembly membership compared to the wider population 
towards people with more permissive attitudes towards immigration.5 The evidence we have 
suggests, however, that, even without this skew, no more than twelve of the fifty Assembly 
Members would have selected option E.6 It appears, at least once people are better 
informed and have had the opportunity to deliberate on the subject, that substantially 
reducing immigration levels is not the majority preference it is often assumed to be.
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This outcome reflected a desire to maintain the benefits of immigration while also minimising 
the costs. That was already apparent from the policy guidelines reported above. Beyond 
measures to remove migrants who cannot support themselves financially and prevent 
benefit fraud, the vote on policy guidelines and feedback from the tables suggested that 
Members also wanted better training for UK citizens to reduce the need for immigration. 
They wanted more effort to relieve pressure on public services in places with high 
immigration. And some at least were open to delaying recent immigrants’ access to benefits, 
even if that might exclude some UK nationals too.
Thus, the Members’ support for option B does not mean that most opposed a reduction in 
overall immigration numbers: most did want total immigration to fall. But they wanted this to 
be done in a targeted and fair way that would minimise harm to the UK economy. 
How significant are these findings?
The results just outlined are striking. Members ideally wanted the government to succeed in 
its efforts to secure a comprehensive bespoke trade deal. But they clearly rejected the idea 
that a ‘no deal’ Brexit should be seriously countenanced, seeing ongoing close alignment 
with the EU as the better fall-back. On migration, they advocated a notably nuanced position.
But how much attention do these findings deserve? To what extent do they genuinely give 
insights into informed public opinion on the Brexit options? Three questions might in 
particular be asked. First, did the Members of the Citizens’ Assembly reflect the broader UK 
electorate? Second, is a group of fifty people really large enough to provide valuable 
insights, when we are used to opinion surveys with samples of at least a thousand? Third, 
were the Assembly’s proceedings of sufficient quality to lend the conclusions credence?
Public consultation exercises are often criticised for attracting only ‘the usual suspects’. But 
the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit was different: Members were not self-selected, but carefully 
chosen through stratified random sampling to ensure they reflected the wider population in 
terms of key socio-demographic factors and how they voted in the 2016 referendum. We 
noted above a slight skew towards participants with relatively liberal views on immigration, 
but this does not appear large enough to explain the Assembly’s conclusions.
Moving to the second question, even if the Assembly resembled the wider electorate, is a 
group of fifty people large enough for its results to be meaningful? Certainly, there is no 
guarantee that a separate exercise with a different group of fifty people would generate 
exactly the same conclusions. The evidence that exists on this point suggests, however, that 
the broad thrust of the results would likely be similar.7 
There could, of course, be a danger of ‘groupthink’, with Members developing over time a 
group-specific conception of the issues. But the Assembly, like other deliberative bodies, 
was designed to avoid this:8 Members were rotated around different subgroups every day; 
the total duration of the Assembly was relatively short; Members had three weeks between 
the two weekends when they lived their usual lives and interacted with non-Members.
Finally, were the Assembly discussions inclusive, informed, balanced, and deliberative, such 
that we can be confident they reflected the informed and considered views of the Members 
on the issues in hand? We set out in the first section some of the steps that we took to 
promote these objectives, including careful weekend design, professional facilitation, and the 
development of a detailed learning programme overseen by a diverse Advisory Board. Our 
evidence suggests that these were successful:
• In terms of inclusion, only one Assembly Member disagreed in a survey conducted at 
the end of the second weekend with the statement ‘I have had ample opportunity in 
the small group discussions to express my views’. There was naturally variation in 
how long Members spoke for: some people like to talk more than others. But there 
were no statistically significant differences in speaking time based on Members’ 
ages, genders, ethnicities, social classes, places of residence, or referendum vote 
choices.9
• In terms of understanding, almost all Members said they had understood most of 
what was said during the weekends and that the Assembly had helped them clarify 
their views. We also gathered feedback from the Assembly facilitators, who were 
impressed with the level of understanding and insight that Members reached in such 
limited time.
• Turning to balance, no Assembly Member disagreed with the statement ‘The 
information I have received during the Assembly has been fair and balanced between 
different viewpoints’. The feedback that we received from all parts of our Advisory 
Board was also positive.
• Quality deliberation, finally, requires not just that diverse and balanced information 
and perspectives be available, but also that participants be open to engaging with 
them: to genuinely listening to others and to explaining their own views, rather than 
just asserting them. No Assembly Member disagreed with the statement ‘I have felt 
that other group members have listened carefully to what I had to say’, and only one 
disagreed with the statement ‘My fellow participants have respected what I had to 
say, even when they didn’t agree with me’. Only nine Members agreed that ‘Many 
people have expressed strong views without offering reasons’.
We will examine the quality of the Assembly’s deliberations in further detail in future 
research. It is already clear, however, that the Members had a rich experience and engaged 
effectively with a range of perspectives before drawing their conclusions. They could not, of 
course, examine all the complexities and technicalities of post-Brexit trade and migration 
policy. But all the evidence we have presented indicates that they heard broad and balanced 
evidence, and that their conclusions do provide important insights into the kind of Brexit that 
people want when they have had an opportunity to learn, think, and deliberate about the 
issues in depth.
The Citizens’ Assembly and UK democracy
The Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit was, on all of the criteria just discussed, a considerable 
success. It brought together a group of people who reflected the diverse make-up of the UK 
electorate. These Members engaged deeply with the issues in hand. Even on this highly 
contentious topic, Members from across the Brexit spectrum engaged constructively and 
respectfully with each other in open and meaningful dialogue. And it proved possible to 
develop a balanced learning programme that was well regarded on all sides of the Brexit 
debate. The Citizens’ Assembly generated clear and meaningful recommendations that 
deserve to be taken seriously.
This success raises the question of whether citizens’ assemblies and other similar 
deliberative engagement methods could play a wider positive role in democracy in the UK 
and elsewhere. Many people – ordinary voters and policy-makers alike – are dissatisfied 
with the current state of democracy. They worry that the quality of debate about crucial 
political decisions is often too low and that influential information can be inaccurate. Scope is 
limited for free and open-mined public discussion in which alternative viewpoints are given 
considered attention and difficult trade-offs are acknowledged. Social media often appear to 
cheapen debate further. Many voters feel disillusioned, while policy-makers feel hampered in 
making decisions that will serve the public interest.
Citizens’ assemblies – or smaller deliberative exercises such as citizens’ juries – could 
contribute valuably to a wide array of policy processes. The information that they provide on 
informed and considered public views is unique, and ought to be valued highly in any 
democratic decision-making.
They might be particularly useful in one specific category of decisions: those where 
politicians want to act, but know that, whichever course they adopt, they will be heavily 
criticised. These are decisions in what Charles Clarke has called the ‘too difficult box’.10 
Prominent examples are the debates over assisted dying and the future of social care. There 
is general agreement that greater spending on social care is needed. But there is 
considerable disagreement over how best to pay for it, rendering successive governments 
reluctant to act. A well designed citizens’ assembly that allowed a representative cross-
section of the population to consider the options, deliberate on their priorities and come up 
with proposals could help deliver a solution that commanded broad public legitimacy. It is 
therefore very welcome that two House of Commons committees held a Citizens’ Assembly 
on Social Care in April and May. The results of this exercise were not yet available at the 
time of writing, but they will merit careful attention.
Conclusion
The evidence from the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit is that most voters want a pragmatic 
Brexit: if the UK is leaving the EU, they want it to strike the best deal possible. They want 
politicians to be concerned, above all, with protecting the economy, public services, and 
living standards across all parts of the UK. Their optimal outcome is a bespoke deal between 
the UK and the EU, such as the UK government is currently pursuing. But if that proves 
unattainable, they would prefer the UK to stay in the Single Market and the Customs Union 
than to leave the EU with no deal. They want to contain immigration while maintaining a 
substantial level of free movement. These are the conclusions of a diverse sample of the UK 
electorate who engaged intensively and deeply with the issues over two weekends. They 
deserve to be taken seriously by policy-makers.
The Assembly suggests also that deliberative bodies such as this could have a valuable 
place in future UK governance. Even on a highly polarised issue such as Brexit, they can 
foster informed, considered, open-minded discussion. Injecting such exercises into other 
processes of decision-making could be valuable for the health of democracy.
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